Fla. Stat. § 790.33 is among the strongest firearm-preemption statutes in the country. It declares the Legislature "occupies the whole field" of...
Reviewed by Will Luker, Founder of CCW Hub. USCCA Training Counselor, USCCA Certified Instructor, NRA Certified Instructor, Law Enforcement.
Fla. Stat. § 790.33 is among the strongest firearm-preemption statutes in the country. It declares the Legislature "occupies the whole field" of firearm regulation, expressly nullifies any existing or future county, city, town, or municipal ordinance or administrative rule on firearms or ammunition, and imposes severe penalties on local officials who knowingly violate preemption - including civil penalties up to $5,000, mandatory attorney-fee awards to plaintiffs who successfully challenge local firearm rules, personal liability for knowingly-violating officials, and removal from office by the Governor. The statute is short-titled the "Joe Carlucci Uniform Firearms Act."
For a license-holder, the practical takeaway is short. Your Florida concealed weapon or firearm license - and your underlying state-law right to own, possess, store, and transport firearms and ammunition - is the same in every county, every city, every town, and every municipality in Florida. No local government can layer a local permit, a local registration scheme, a local "no firearms in the park" rule, an assault-weapon ban, a magazine-capacity limit, an ammunition-tax, a local waiting period, or a discharge-on-private-property rule on top of state law. Any pre-1987 ordinance to that effect was wiped out by § 790.33(1)-(2) the moment the statute was enacted, and any post-1987 attempt is void from inception, exposes the local government to a permanent injunction, exposes the responsible officials personally to a civil fine of up to $5,000, and exposes the local treasury to mandatory attorney-fee awards (with a contingency-fee multiplier) plus actual damages up to $100,000. If you read about a Florida ordinance that purports to regulate the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, storage, or transportation of firearms or ammunition, it is almost certainly preempted, and the courts have a clear and aggressive enforcement toolkit to prove it.
Section 790.33(1), titled "Preemption," is the heart of the statute. It reads:
"Except as expressly provided by the State Constitution or general law, the Legislature hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition, including the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, storage, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any administrative regulations or rules adopted by local or state government relating thereto. Any such existing ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby declared null and void."
Four things to notice in that text.
Subsection (2) sets out the Legislature's stated purpose. Subsection (2)(a) lists four objectives: (i) "to provide uniform firearms laws in the state," (ii) "to declare all ordinances and regulations null and void which have been enacted by any jurisdictions other than state and federal, which regulate firearms, ammunition, or components thereof," (iii) "to prohibit the enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to firearms, ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically authorized by this section or general law," and (iv) "to require local jurisdictions to enforce state firearms laws." Subsection (2)(b) adds a deterrence purpose: "to deter and prevent the violation of this section and the violation of rights protected under the constitution and laws of this state related to firearms, ammunition, or components thereof, by the abuse of official authority that occurs when enactments are passed in violation of state law or under color of local or state authority."
Two doctrinal points sit inside that intent statement. First, the field is closed unless the Legislature itself opens it. A local government that wants to regulate firearms must point to "this section or general law" (i.e., § 790.33's own narrow exceptions or another statewide statute) for affirmative authority - not to the absence of a state-law prohibition. Second, the Legislature characterized local firearm ordinances as an "abuse of official authority." That framing supports the personal-liability and removal-from-office penalties that follow in subsection (3).
Subsection (3) is what gives Florida's preemption statute its teeth. It is the most aggressive enforcement scheme in any state preemption statute in the country.
§ 790.33(3)(a) - Liability rule. Any "person, county, agency, municipality, district, or other entity" that violates the Legislature's occupation of the whole field "by enacting or causing to be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule or regulation impinging upon such exclusive occupation of the field shall be liable as set forth herein." The verb is "shall." Liability is automatic on violation; the question for the court is the remedy, not whether liability attaches.
§ 790.33(3)(b) - Mandatory injunction. If a local government violates § 790.33, "the court shall declare the improper ordinance, regulation, or rule invalid and issue a permanent injunction against the local government prohibiting it from enforcing such ordinance, regulation, or rule." The statute then forecloses the standard government defenses: "It is no defense that in enacting the ordinance, regulation, or rule the local government was acting in good faith or upon advice of counsel." A city cannot defend a preempted ordinance on the ground that the city attorney told the council the ordinance was lawful.
§ 790.33(3)(c) - Personal civil fines. "If the court determines that a violation was knowing and willful, the court shall assess a civil fine of up to $5,000 against the elected or appointed local government official or officials or administrative agency head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred." The fine runs against the person, not the political subdivision. Council members, county commissioners, and agency heads who knowingly enact or enforce a preempted ordinance face a $5,000 personal exposure each.
§ 790.33(3)(d) - No public-funds defense. "Except as required by applicable law, public funds may not be used to defend or reimburse the unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly and willfully violated this section." A city cannot indemnify or reimburse the council members who voted for a preempted ordinance once a court finds the violation was knowing and willful. The personal exposure under (3)(c) cannot be quietly absorbed by the city's general fund.
§ 790.33(3)(e) - Removal from office. "A knowing and willful violation of any provision of this section by a person acting in an official capacity for any entity enacting or causing to be enforced a local ordinance or administrative rule or regulation prohibited under paragraph (a) or otherwise under color of law shall be cause for termination of employment or contract or removal from office by the Governor." Florida is the only state that authorizes the Governor to remove an elected official from office for violating firearm preemption. The removal power is not theoretical - it has been wielded as a credible threat against local officials since the 2011 amendment that added (3)(c)-(e).
§ 790.33(3)(f) - Private right of action. Any person, or any organization whose membership is adversely affected by a preempted ordinance or rule, "may file suit against any county, agency, municipality, district, or other entity in any court of this state having jurisdiction over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and for actual damages." The statute sets the prevailing-plaintiff remedies in mandatory terms: "A court shall award the prevailing plaintiff" both "[r]easonable attorney fees and costs in accordance with the laws of this state, including a contingency fee multiplier, as authorized by law" and "[t]he actual damages incurred, but not more than $100,000." The voluntary-cessation rule in § 790.33(3)(f)2 closes the obvious workaround: if the defendant repeals the offending ordinance after suit is filed, the plaintiff is still treated as the prevailing party for fee-shifting purposes. Interest runs from the date of filing.
The combined effect of (3)(b)-(f) is a fee-shifted, personally-enforceable, automatically-injunctive remedy structure that gives any Floridian - and any organization - standing and incentive to sue. That structure is why post-1987 challenges to Florida local firearm ordinances are routinely litigated to verdict rather than settled by quiet repeal: the plaintiff who litigates collects fees; the plaintiff who settles before judgment may not.
Section 790.33(4) is a closed list of five exceptions. The list is short, and each exception is narrow.
Beyond the (4) exceptions, several things sit outside § 790.33's reach as a matter of scope rather than as enumerated carve-outs.
Section 790.33's automatic-null-and-void rule extinguished a long list of pre-1987 Florida local firearm ordinances on the day the statute took effect. After the 2011 amendment added the personal-fine, no-public-funds, and removal-from-office penalties, Florida saw a wave of post-litigation repeals as cities and counties cleaned up ordinances that had escaped attention. The categories of ordinances that have been invalidated, repealed, or enjoined under § 790.33 include the following.
Florida's enforcement experience since 2011 is that the deterrent effect of § 790.33(3) has been substantially more important than the volume of litigation. Once a county attorney explains to a board of commissioners that voting "yes" on a preempted ordinance carries a personal $5,000 exposure, no public-funds reimbursement, and a Governor-initiated removal proceeding, most preempted ordinances die in committee. The handful that reach final passage are usually repealed quickly after the first challenge letter.
For a Florida concealed-weapon licensee, the takeaway is uniformity. Your § 790.06 license functions identically across Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Orange, Hillsborough, Pinellas, Duval, Leon, Escambia, and every other county. A municipality cannot impose a local permit requirement, a local registration of carry-licensees, a local "no-carry" zone in its parks or on its beaches, a local mandatory-storage rule on a vehicle parked on a municipal lot, or a local restriction on what firearms or ammunition you may purchase, possess, store, or transport. The state-law location restrictions in § 790.06(12) and § 790.115 (school grounds) are the operative location list; the local-ordinance overlay does not exist.
For a Florida firearm dealer, the takeaway is parity. Generally-applicable zoning rules apply, generally-applicable business taxes apply, and the ATF's federal regulatory structure applies. A municipality cannot impose firearm-specific dealer-licensing, firearm-specific recordkeeping rules beyond ATF requirements, firearm-specific signage, or firearm-specific tax. Display, transfer, and inventory are within the preempted field.
For a Florida private buyer or seller, the takeaway is the constitutional carve-out. The Legislature occupies "the whole field" of firearm regulation in § 790.33(1), but the statute itself bows to "the State Constitution or general law." The Florida Constitution's Article VIII, § 5(b) waiting-period provision for county-held gun shows is the rare local rule that operates by direct constitutional grant, not by ordinance. Outside that constitutional carve-out, private transfers in Florida are governed by state and federal law alone - and § 790.25 (lawful uses of arms) protects the private transfer of long guns and handguns between non-prohibited Florida residents under the conditions state and federal law prescribe.
For a Florida local elected official, the takeaway is exposure. The 2011 amendments to § 790.33(3) make voting for a preempted ordinance an act of personal financial risk. The "knowing and willful" standard is the only thing standing between an official and the $5,000 personal fine, the no-public-funds rule, and the Governor's removal authority - and once the county attorney has explained § 790.33 in a public meeting, an official's vote in favor of a clearly-preempted ordinance is not a hard "knowing and willful" finding for a court to make.
The "Joe Carlucci Uniform Firearms Act" - the short-title bestowed by § 790.33(5) - does what its name promises. Florida has uniform firearm laws. The Legislature wrote them, the Legislature controls them, and the Legislature has attached enough enforcement teeth to § 790.33(3) that local governments rarely test the rule for long.
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