Michigan has a comprehensive state preemption law that strips local units of government of authority to regulate firearms within the subjects the statute...
Reviewed by Will Luker, Founder of CCW Hub. USCCA Training Counselor, USCCA Certified Instructor, NRA Certified Instructor, Law Enforcement.
Michigan has a comprehensive state preemption law that strips local units of government of authority to regulate firearms within the subjects the statute names. The state occupies that field to the exclusion of cities, villages, townships, and counties.
Michigan's preemption statute, Sec. 2 of 1990 PA 319 (as amended by 2015 PA 29, effective August 10, 2015), provides:
"A local unit of government shall not impose special taxation on, enact or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols, other firearms, or pneumatic guns, ammunition for pistols or other firearms, or components of pistols or other firearms, except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state."
The 2015 amendment added "or pneumatic guns" to the list of items local governments may not regulate. Some older court opinions, including the 2012 Capital Area District Library decision discussed below, quote the pre-2015 text that does not include pneumatic guns.
Under MCL 123.1101(b), "local unit of government" means "a city, village, township, or county." Subsection (a) of MCL 123.1101 defines "firearm," subsection (c) defines "pistol," and subsection (d) defines "pneumatic gun." This subsection lettering reflects the statute as amended in 2015. Note that the 2012 Capital Area District Library opinion cites the same definition as MCL 123.1101(a) because it predates the 2015 renumbering. The substance is identical: only a city, village, township, or county is a "local unit of government" for preemption purposes.
The preemption law was enacted as 1990 PA 319 to address the "proliferation of local regulation regarding firearm ownership, sale, and possession" and the "concern that continued local authority to enact and enforce gun control ordinances may result in the establishment of a patchwork of ordinances." (House Legislative Analysis, HB 5437, January 30, 1991, p 1, as quoted in Capital Area District Library v. Michigan Open Carry, Inc.)
Michigan courts have read the preemption statute broadly, but the Michigan Supreme Court has confirmed it reaches only the entities the Legislature listed.
In Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndale, 256 Mich App 401 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that, in effect, "state law completely occupies the field of regulation that the Ferndale ordinance seeks to enter," striking down a city ordinance that banned weapons in city-owned buildings such as city hall, fire stations, and the library. The court reasoned that the statutory language is "broad and all-encompassing" and "cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude local ordinances that address the carrying of firearms in municipal buildings."
In Michigan Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 502 Mich 695 (2018), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowed the reach of that "completely occupies the field" language. The Court held that MCL 123.1102 "expressly preempts regulation of firearms by a city, village, township, or county," but "does not apply to school districts, which are left out of the Legislature's list." Because MCL 123.1102 and MCL 123.1101 reflect the Legislature's intent to preempt some local units of government but not others, that intent controls, and school district firearm policies are therefore not field-preempted. The Court overruled Ferndale to the extent it had cited MCL 123.1102 to support the proposition that state law "completely occupied the field of firearms regulation" in a way that would reach entities outside the statutory list.
The practical upshot is that MCL 123.1102 bars firearm regulation by the listed local units of government (city, village, township, county) within the enumerated subjects. Entities not on that list are analyzed under the implied-preemption test from People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 (1977).
In Capital Area District Library v. Michigan Open Carry, Inc., 298 Mich App 220 (No. 304582, October 25, 2012), the Court of Appeals held that field preemption reaches a quasi-municipal corporation such as a district library, even though a district library is not within the MCL 123.1101 definition of "local unit of government." The court applied the four-factor Llewellyn analysis:
Because all factors favored preemption, the court held the library's weapons policy preempted to the extent it regulated firearm possession.
Local governments are preempted from regulating firearms, but the state has enacted its own location-based restrictions. These are state law, not local ordinances, so they are not affected by preemption.
MCL 750.234d(1) prohibits possession of a firearm, subject to the exceptions in subsection (2), on the premises of:
MCL 750.234d(2) exempts, among others, a peace officer and a person licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon (MCL 750.234d(2)(c)). A violation of MCL 750.234d is a misdemeanor punishable by up to 90 days, a fine of up to $100, or both (MCL 750.234d(8)).
MCL 750.234d(3), added by 2024 PA 157 and 2024 PA 158 (effective April 2, 2025), prohibits firearm possession at voting-related locations, subject to the exceptions in subsections (4) and (5):
MCL 750.234d(4) exempts a peace officer, a person on that person's own residence or private property (or with permission to be there), and a person carrying a concealed pistol who is licensed by this state or another state. MCL 750.234d(5) exempts a person lawfully transporting or possessing a firearm in a vehicle. A separate provision, MCL 750.234d(6), restricts firearms at an absent voter counting place while ballots are being processed, exempting only a uniformed law enforcement officer acting in the course of duty (MCL 750.234d(7)).
MCL 750.237a(4) prohibits possession of a weapon in a weapon-free school zone, which MCL 750.237a(6)(e) defines as "school property and a vehicle used by a school to transport students to or from school property." A peace officer and a person licensed to carry a concealed weapon are exempt (MCL 750.237a(5)).
MCL 750.237a does not punish "any felony" committed in a school zone. Instead, MCL 750.237a(1) and (2) enhance the penalty only for the specific weapon offenses the statute lists. Conduct proscribed under sections 224, 224a, 224b, 224c, 224e, 226, 227, 227a, 227f, 234a, 234b, or 234c, or a second or subsequent violation of section 223(2), committed in a weapon-free school zone is a felony (MCL 750.237a(1)). Conduct proscribed under sections 223(1), 224d, 227c, 227d, 231c, 232a(1) or (4), 233, 234, 234e, 234f, 235, 236, or 237, or a first violation of section 223(2), committed in a weapon-free school zone is a misdemeanor (MCL 750.237a(2)). Offenses not listed in the statute are not subject to these school-zone enhancements.
MCL 28.425o(1) prohibits a CPL holder (or a person exempt from licensure under section 12a(h) of Act 372 of 1927, codified as MCL 28.432a(h)) from carrying a concealed pistol, subject to the exceptions in subsection (5), on the premises of:
Under MCL 28.425o, "premises" does not include the parking areas of these places.
Penalties under MCL 28.425o(6) escalate:
| Violation | Classification | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| First | State civil infraction | Fine up to $500 and a 6-month CPL suspension (MCL 28.425o(6)(a)) |
| Second | Misdemeanor | Fine up to $1,000 and CPL revocation (MCL 28.425o(6)(b)) |
| Third or subsequent | Felony | Up to 4 years imprisonment or a fine up to $5,000, or both, and CPL revocation (MCL 28.425o(6)(c)) |
Michigan's firearm laws coexist with, and are not displaced by, the federal Gun Control Act. In In re Timothy Erik Schultz, No. 350292 (Mich Ct App 2020), the Court of Appeals held that Michigan's statutes restoring a felon's firearm rights (MCL 750.224f and MCL 28.424) are not preempted by the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 USC 922(g). The court relied on 18 USC 927, under which no provision of the federal chapter is construed to "occupy the field . . . to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict." Because restoring rights under Michigan law for state-law purposes does not impair federal enforcement of 18 USC 922(g), there was no direct and positive conflict. The court also noted that 18 USC 921(a)(20) recognizes a state's authority to restore a felon's firearm rights for state-law purposes.
Because MCL 123.1102 binds only cities, villages, townships, and counties, several state-level or quasi-state entities may restrict firearms on their own property even though local governments could not:
MCL 28.526 (Sec. 16 of 2008 PA 537) provides that the retired law enforcement officer act "does not preempt any existing state or federal statute, regulation, or other authority governing the use, possession, carrying, or receiving of firearms or ammunition in this state, including application by a qualified retired law enforcement officer to carry a concealed firearm under 18 USC 926C."
This page covers one part of our Michigan concealed carry guide.
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