New York's use of force rules are codified in Penal Law Article 35 (Justification). New York maintains a duty to retreat before using deadly physical force...
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New York's use of force rules are codified in Penal Law Article 35 (Justification). New York maintains a duty to retreat before using deadly physical force outside the home and does not have a "Stand Your Ground" law. Courts apply a combined objective and subjective "reasonably believes" standard when deciding whether force was justified.
Justification is a separate question from whether the firearm was lawfully carried. In New York a license issued under Penal Law 400.00 is required to possess or carry a handgun, and possession in certain places is a crime regardless of any license (see "How This Interacts With Carrying" below). A justified use of force does not cure an unlawful-possession charge, and a lawful carry does not by itself justify the use of force.
A person may use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself, or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person.
This general right does not apply in three situations spelled out in Penal Law 35.15(1):
A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under the circumstances in subdivision one unless one of the following is true:
Note: the prior version of subdivision (2)(b) referred to "forcible sodomy." The statute now reads "forcible aggravated sexual abuse" and "a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this chapter by force." This is the current statutory text as of January 1, 2026.
New York's justification standard contains both a subjective and an objective element, as established by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986).
The defendant must have actually believed that deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of one of the enumerated felonies.
The defendant's belief must also be one that a reasonable person in the defendant's situation could have held. A purely subjective belief, no matter how genuine, is not sufficient if it would not be shared by a reasonable person under the same circumstances.
The Court of Appeals has explained that the objective reasonableness inquiry is not made in a vacuum. The "circumstances" and "situation" of the defendant can include:
"We cannot lightly impute to the Legislature an intent to fundamentally alter the principles of justification to allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm." - People v. Goetz
New York requires retreat before the use of deadly physical force when the actor knows it can be done with complete personal safety to oneself and others. This is the key distinction from "Stand Your Ground" states. The duty applies to deadly physical force; it does not require retreat before using ordinary, non-deadly physical force.
"The duty to retreat reflects the idea that a killing is justified only as a last resort, an act impermissible as long as other reasonable avenues are open." - People v. Jones, 3 N.Y.3d 491, 494 (2004)
A person who knows they can retreat with complete safety may not use deadly physical force, except where one of the statutory exceptions applies (the dwelling, the enumerated felonies, or a qualifying burglary).
New York recognizes a Castle exception: under Penal Law 35.15(2)(a)(i) there is no duty to retreat when a person is in their own dwelling and is not the initial aggressor.
"It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home." - People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)
Penal Law 35.20 governs force used to defend premises, separate from defense of a person under 35.15:
The terms "premises," "building," and "dwelling" in 35.20 take their meanings from Penal Law 140.00. What counts as a "dwelling" can differ depending on context (People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)).
New York is a licensed-carry state, not a permitless or constitutional-carry state. A few overlays matter for anyone who carries:
Litigation note: the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (effective September 1, 2022) was challenged in Antonyuk v. James (formerly Antonyuk v. Hochul). In Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2024), cert. denied (2025), the Second Circuit upheld most of the law, including the good-moral-character standard, the 18 hours of training, the in-person interview, and the reference requirement. The court enjoined the place-of-worship sensitive-location ban, and that ban is not enforced. The requirement to disclose social-media accounts under Penal Law 400.00(1)(o)(iv) was struck down as unconstitutional and is not enforced. The private-property default under Penal Law 265.01-d was struck by a federal district court and its appellate status remains unsettled. Verify the current status of any specific location rule before relying on it.
New York City has its own separate and stricter handgun licensing regime under the NYC Administrative Code (10-131) and Title 38 of the Rules of the City of New York. A license or permit issued outside the City does not automatically authorize carry within New York City.
| Statute | Subject |
|---|---|
| Penal Law 35.15 | Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person |
| Penal Law 35.15(1) | General rule, non-deadly force, and exclusions (provocation, initial aggressor, combat by agreement) |
| Penal Law 35.15(2) | Restrictions on deadly physical force, duty to retreat, dwelling exception |
| Penal Law 35.20 | Justification; defense of premises and defense of a person in the course of burglary |
| Penal Law 35.30 | Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or preventing an escape |
| Penal Law 140.00 | Definitions of "premises," "building," and "dwelling" |
| Penal Law 400.00 | Handgun licensing, including good-moral-character and training requirements |
| Penal Law 265.01-d | Criminal possession of a weapon in a restricted location (private-property default; the default-no-carry rule was struck by a federal district court and is unsettled on appeal) |
| Penal Law 265.01-e | Criminal possession of a firearm, rifle, or shotgun in a sensitive location (upheld generally; the place-of-worship ban is enjoined and not enforced) |
| Case | Citation | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Goetz | 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986) | "Reasonably believes" in Penal Law 35.15 requires both an actual subjective belief and objective reasonableness; rejected a purely subjective standard |
| People v. Aiken | 4 N.Y.3d 324 (2005) | A person in the doorway between an apartment and a common hall has a duty to retreat into the home when it can be done safely |
| People v. Jones | 3 N.Y.3d 491 (2004) | Affirmed the duty to retreat as reflecting that deadly force is justified only as a last resort |
| People v. Tomlins | 213 N.Y. 240 (1914) | Established the dwelling exception; no duty to retreat when assailed in one's own home (Cardozo, J.) |
| People v. Hernandez | 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002) | Addressed what constitutes a "dwelling" for justification purposes |
| People v. Miller | 39 N.Y.2d 543 (1976) | A defendant may introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased to support a self-defense claim |
| Antonyuk v. James | 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024) | Upheld most of the Concealed Carry Improvement Act, but enjoined the place-of-worship sensitive-location ban and struck the social-media-disclosure requirement |
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024). Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), established the historical-tradition test for Second Amendment claims and struck New York's "proper cause" licensing standard, prompting the Concealed Carry Improvement Act. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), then applied Bruen to uphold the federal domestic-violence-restraining-order firearm prohibition at 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), confirming that not every firearm disability fails Bruen's test. Anyone advising on use of force or firearm-disability questions should be familiar with both cases.
This page covers one part of our New York concealed carry guide.
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