New York's use of force rules are codified in Penal Law Article 35 (Justification). New York does not have a "Stand Your Ground" law. Penal Law...
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New York's use of force rules are codified in Penal Law Article 35 (Justification). New York does not have a "Stand Your Ground" law. Penal Law 35.15(2)(a) requires retreat before deadly physical force when the actor knows retreat can be made with complete personal safety to himself or herself and others. The statute lists only two exceptions to that retreat obligation: the actor is in his or her own dwelling and not the initial aggressor, or the actor is a police officer, peace officer, or a person assisting one at that officer's direction. The Court of Appeals applies a combined subjective and objective test to the statute's "reasonably believes" language when deciding whether force was justified.
Justification is a separate question from whether the firearm was lawfully carried. In New York a license issued under Penal Law 400.00 is required to possess or carry a handgun, and possession in certain places is a crime regardless of any license (see "How This Interacts With Carrying" below). A justified use of force does not cure an unlawful-possession charge, and a lawful carry does not by itself justify the use of force.
A person may use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself, or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person.
This general right does not apply in three situations spelled out in Penal Law 35.15(1):
A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under the circumstances in subdivision one unless one of the following is true:
Note: subdivision (2)(b) reads "forcible aggravated sexual abuse" and "a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this chapter by force." Confirm the current text on the New York State Senate legislation site before relying on it.
New York's justification standard contains both a subjective and an objective element, as established by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986).
The defendant must have actually believed that deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of one of the enumerated felonies.
The defendant's belief must also be one that a reasonable person in the defendant's situation could have held. A purely subjective belief, no matter how genuine, is not sufficient if it would not be shared by a reasonable person under the same circumstances.
In Goetz the Court of Appeals explained that the objective reasonableness inquiry is not made in a vacuum. The "circumstances" and "situation" of the defendant can include:
The Court set out the order of the inquiry. The jury first decides whether the defendant actually held the beliefs Penal Law 35.15 requires. If the People do not disprove those beliefs beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury then considers whether the beliefs were reasonable, asking in light of all the circumstances "if a reasonable person could have had these beliefs."
"We cannot lightly impute to the Legislature an intent to fundamentally alter the principles of justification to allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm." - People v. Goetz
New York requires retreat before the use of deadly physical force when the actor knows it can be done with complete personal safety to oneself and others. This is the key distinction from "Stand Your Ground" states. The duty applies to deadly physical force; it does not require retreat before using ordinary, non-deadly physical force.
"The duty to retreat reflects the idea that a killing is justified only as a last resort, an act impermissible as long as other reasonable avenues are open." - People v. Jones, 3 N.Y.3d 491, 494 (2004)
A person who knows they can retreat with complete personal safety to themselves and others may not use deadly physical force in the situation covered by Penal Law 35.15(2)(a). The statute lists only two exceptions to that retreat obligation. The actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is:
The retreat obligation is written into paragraph (2)(a), which covers the general deadly-force scenario. The separate justifications in paragraphs (2)(b) and (2)(c) (certain forcible felonies, and burglary under the circumstances described in Penal Law 35.20(3)) do not contain a retreat clause of their own. They are not retreat exceptions but different routes to justification with their own elements, and they are not a way around subdivision one. All of Penal Law 35.15(2) operates "under circumstances specified in subdivision one," so a person who provoked the encounter, was the initial aggressor without an effective withdrawal, or entered a combat by agreement is outside paragraphs (2)(b) and (2)(c) as well.
On a public street, in a store, in a workplace, or in a business the person does not occupy as a dwelling, a defender relying on paragraph (2)(a), the general deadly-force route, who knows a retreat can be made with complete personal safety to himself or herself and others must retreat before using deadly physical force.
Paragraphs (2)(b) and (2)(c) work differently, and the difference matters most in exactly the situation people ask about. In People v. Goetz the Court of Appeals said that "the portion of section 35.15 (2) (b) pertaining to the use of deadly physical force to avert a felony such as robbery does not contain a separate 'retreat' requirement." So a person who reasonably believes another is committing or attempting one of the felonies listed in (2)(b), which include robbery, kidnapping and the forcible sexual offenses, is not under the paragraph (2)(a) duty to retreat.
That is not permission to stand your ground in public. Goetz went on to hold that "the general 'necessity' requirement in subdivision (1) applies to all uses of force under section 35.15, including the use of deadly physical force under subdivision (2) (b)," so the force must still be what the actor reasonably believes necessary to avert the threat, and the subdivision one bars on provocation, initial aggression and combat by agreement still apply. Whether (2)(b) or (2)(c) reaches a particular set of facts is a question for a New York attorney and, in the end, for the court.
New York recognizes a Castle exception: under Penal Law 35.15(2)(a)(i) there is no duty to retreat when a person is in their own dwelling and is not the initial aggressor.
"It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home." - People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)
Penal Law 35.20 governs force used to defend premises, separate from defense of a person under 35.15:
The terms "premises," "building," and "dwelling" in 35.20 take their meanings from Penal Law 140.00. That cross-reference is written "As used in this section," so it governs Penal Law 35.20 and does not carry over to the retreat exception in Penal Law 35.15(2)(a)(i). For that exception the Court of Appeals held in People v. Hernandez that "dwelling" "refers to a person's residence" and turns on exclusive possession and control of the area in question. Treat the two questions separately.
New York is a licensed-carry state, not a permitless or constitutional-carry state. A few overlays matter for anyone who carries:
Litigation note: the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (effective September 1, 2022) was challenged in Antonyuk v. James (formerly Antonyuk v. Hochul). In Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2024), decided on remand, the Second Circuit upheld most of the law, including the good-moral-character standard, the 18 hours of training, the in-person interview, the four character references, the cohabitant disclosure and the catch-all. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 7, 2025 (No. 24-795). The court vacated the district court's preliminary injunction against the place-of-worship provision, Penal Law 265.01-e(2)(c), which is in force. It preserved the injunction only as to Penal Law 400.00(1)(o)(iv) and Penal Law 265.01-d as applied to private property held open to the general public.
On the social-media requirement: no court has held Penal Law 400.00(1)(o)(iv) unconstitutional, and it has not been repealed. It is on the books and off the form. A stipulation of partial settlement in Antonyuk, so ordered by U.S. District Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on March 30, 2026, added a permanent injunction against enforcing that subparagraph against the named plaintiff, plus the Superintendent's agreement that "The Superintendent shall ensure that the PPB-3 license application form does not include language requiring social media information." The injunction terminates if the Legislature repeals the subparagraph, and a consent stipulation carries no precedential value. The text stays in the statute, and the current PPB-3 does not ask for social media accounts.
Christian v. James, 176 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. May 18, 2026) affirmed the permanent injunction against enforcing Penal Law 265.01-d as to private property open to the public, and affirmed judgment for the State on the public parks provision, Penal Law 265.01-e(2)(d).
Some of this is unresolved as of August 25, 2026. In Christian the court lifted the stay on the public-transit claim on August 17, 2026 and that claim is undecided, with Penal Law 265.01-e(2)(n) in force. In an August 14, 2026 joint status letter the Christian plaintiffs said they anticipated petitioning for certiorari on the public parks ban "before the deadline of September 16, 2026." Summary-judgment briefing in Antonyuk closes September 18, 2026 with no ruling. Confirm the current enforcement status on gunsafety.ny.gov before relying on any of it.
New York City is a separate licensing universe. Penal Law 400.00(6) provides that a license "not otherwise limited as to place or time of possession, shall be effective throughout the state, except that the same shall not be valid within the city of New York unless a special permit granting validity is issued by the police commissioner of that city." City licenses issue from the police commissioner under Administrative Code 10-131 and Title 38 of the Rules of the City of New York. A license issued by a county licensing officer does not by itself authorize carry within New York City.
| Statute | Subject |
|---|---|
| Penal Law 35.15 | Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person |
| Penal Law 35.15(1) | General rule, non-deadly force, and exclusions (provocation, initial aggressor, combat by agreement) |
| Penal Law 35.15(2) | Restrictions on deadly physical force, duty to retreat, dwelling exception |
| Penal Law 35.20 | Justification; defense of premises and defense of a person in the course of burglary |
| Penal Law 35.30 | Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or preventing an escape |
| Penal Law 140.00 | Definitions of "premises," "building," and "dwelling" |
| Penal Law 400.00 | Handgun licensing, including good-moral-character and training requirements |
| Penal Law 265.01-d | Criminal possession of a weapon in a restricted location, a class E felony. On the books and enjoined in part: enforcement as to private property open to the public is barred by the permanent injunction affirmed in Christian v. James, 176 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. 2026). It still applies on its own terms to private property not held open to the public |
| Penal Law 265.01-e | Criminal possession of a firearm, rifle, or shotgun in a sensitive location, a class E felony. All twenty paragraphs of subdivision 2 are in force, places of worship under (2)(c) included |
| Case | Citation | Holding |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Goetz | 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986) | "Reasonably believes" in Penal Law 35.15 requires both an actual subjective belief and objective reasonableness; rejected a purely subjective standard |
| People v. Aiken | 4 N.Y.3d 324 (2005) | A defendant standing in the doorway between his apartment and the common hall of a multi-unit building has a duty under Penal Law 35.15 to retreat into his home when he can safely do so |
| People v. Jones | 3 N.Y.3d 491 (2004) | "The duty to retreat reflects the idea that a killing is justified only as a last resort." Affirmed "the castle doctrine in its application to occupants of the same household" |
| People v. Tomlins | 213 N.Y. 240 (1914) | "It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat." The rule is the same "whether the attack proceeds from some other occupant or from an intruder" (Cardozo, J.) |
| People v. Hernandez | 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002) | "Dwelling" in Penal Law 35.15(2)(a)(i) "refers to a person's residence," and whether an area is part of it "depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question." The lobby and common stairwell were not part of the defendant's dwelling |
| Antonyuk v. James | 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024) | On remand, upheld most of the Concealed Carry Improvement Act and vacated the preliminary injunction against the place-of-worship provision, Penal Law 265.01-e(2)(c). Preserved the injunction only as to Penal Law 400.00(1)(o)(iv) and Penal Law 265.01-d as applied to private property held open to the general public. Certiorari denied April 7, 2025 (No. 24-795) |
| Christian v. James | 176 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. 2026) | Affirmed the permanent injunction against enforcing Penal Law 265.01-d as to private property open to the public, and affirmed judgment for the State on the public parks provision, Penal Law 265.01-e(2)(d) |
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024). Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), established the historical-tradition test for Second Amendment claims and struck New York's "proper cause" licensing standard, prompting the Concealed Carry Improvement Act. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), then applied Bruen to uphold the federal domestic-violence-restraining-order firearm prohibition at 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), confirming that not every firearm disability fails Bruen's test. Anyone advising on use of force or firearm-disability questions should be familiar with both cases.
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